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<p>For younger generations the memory of 9/11 – and the subsequent breakdown in trust – has become less shaped by formal news coverage and more by the emergence of <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/blogs-trending-42195513">online subcultures</a>, <a href="https://www.slate.com/articles/technology/users/2015/07/teenagers_and_9_11_trutherism_jokes_how_these_memes_became_a_phenomenon.html">dark humour</a> and <a href="https://www.rollingstone.com/culture/culture-features/9-11-meme-gen-z-1235097749/">internet memes</a>. </p>

<p>One example can be found in the conspiracy-turned-meme “<a href="https://meme.com/memes/jet-fuel-cant-melt-steel-beams">jet fuel can’t melt steel beams</a>”. First popularised as a genuine argument by <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Loose_Change">“9/11 truther” conspiracy theorists</a>, the phrase has become an online joke used widely to mock conspiratorial thinking.</p>

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<p><a href="https://theconversation.com/why-gen-z-turns-everything-even-murder-into-a-joke-287168">Research suggests</a> that dark humour can function as a coping mechanism for alienated younger generations when navigating <a href="https://www.versobooks.com/en-gb/products/3460-hyperpolitics?srsltid=AfmBOoodF7FO0FtWV19DEIwXVgmYbYZeU37fv7-TESy_xc--mXUuXJ_B">hyperpolitical</a> media environments. It can <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/1369148120930594">lower the barrier</a> for entry, allowing people to become active creators of political content, rather than passive consumers. </p>

<p>At the same time, however, <a href="https://www.bath.ac.uk/announcements/memes-spread-conspiracy-theories-by-uniting-online-groups-shows-new-research/">critics argue</a> that the use of these seemingly benign formats can help strengthen online communities and normalise extreme political views. As a result, it can further undermine trust in mainstream institutions. Indeed, much online <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2020/09/how-memes-lulz-and-ironic-bigotry-won-internet/616427/">content</a> invokes the same kind of <a href="https://www.csohate.org/2025/11/03/islamophobia-and-new-york-city-mayoral-election/">base Islamophobia</a> seen during the early years of the “war on terror”.</p>

<h2>An age of disinformation</h2>

<p>Coverage of 9/11 offers a case study in how mainstream media can inadvertently engineer its own decline. By setting aside basic journalistic norms in favour of patriotic consensus and top-down, fear-driven narratives, news organisations helped transform public scepticism about the reasons behind the terrorist attacks into deep-seated cynicism. </p>

<p>The conspiracy theories that emerged in the aftermath of 9/11 helped lay the foundation for the modern “<a href="https://www.google.co.uk/books/edition/The_Disinformation_Age/fqWRzQEACAAJ?hl=en">disinformation age</a>”, from the emergence of QAnon to COVID-19 denialism. </p>

<p>Twenty-five years on, we live in the information landscape that 9/11 built: one where institutional authority is <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2025/08/us-democratic-backsliding-in-comparative-perspective">routinely rejected</a>, trust is fragmented along <a href="https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2025/12/04/public-trust-in-government-1958-2025/">partisan lines</a>, and the line between <a href="https://theconversation.com/social-media-influencers-blur-the-lines-between-political-content-and-campaigning-potentially-affecting-elections-255382">news, political grievance and viral infotainment</a> has been permanently blurred.<!-- Below is The Conversation's page counter tag. Please DO NOT REMOVE. --><img src="https://counter.theconversation.com/content/289574/count.gif?distributor=republish-lightbox-basic" alt="The Conversation" width="1" height="1" style="border: none !important; box-shadow: none !important; margin: 0 !important; max-height: 1px !important; max-width: 1px !important; min-height: 1px !important; min-width: 1px !important; opacity: 0 !important; outline: none !important; padding: 0 !important" referrerpolicy="no-referrer-when-downgrade" /><!-- End of code. If you don't see any code above, please get new code from the Advanced tab after you click the republish button. The page counter does not collect any personal data. More info: https://theconversation.com/republishing-guidelines --></p>

<p><span><a href="https://theconversation.com/profiles/jared-ahmad-977038">Jared Ahmad</a>, Lecturer in Journalism, Politics and Communication , <em><a href="https://theconversation.com/institutions/university-of-sheffield-1147">University of Sheffield</a></em></span></p>

<p>This article is republished from <a href="https://theconversation.com">The Conversation</a> under a Creative Commons license. Read the <a href="https://theconversation.com/9-11-transformed-our-relationship-with-news-and-laid-the-groundwork-for-todays-crisis-of-trust-289574">original article</a>.</p> </div>

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