News · August 19, 2026 · The Conversation · 5 min
As drone use proliferates, responses to the threat they pose in and beyond the battlefield continue apace.
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<span><a href="https://theconversation.com/profiles/anna-jackman-226637">Anna Jackman</a>, <em><a href="https://theconversation.com/institutions/university-of-reading-902">University of Reading</a></em></span>
<p>From the Ukraine war and suspected drone sightings at Europe’s busiest airports to the seizure of over 700 unauthorised drones during the 2026 Fifa World Cup, the skies above us and news reporting are abuzz with drones. </p>
<p>Spanning different sizes and functions, <a href="https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/cbp-7734/">drones</a> have become essential military tools and mainstays of contemporary conflicts. This is <a href="https://www.reuters.com/graphics/UKRAINE-CRISIS/KILL-ZONE/znpnojmknvl/">depicted</a> by the saturation of the Russia-Ukraine frontline “kill zone” with thousands of cheap yet deadly drones – a <a href="https://irregularwarfarecenter.org/publications/insights/six-key-lessons-from-ukraines-drone-war/">new combat ecosystem</a> that has seen troops become involved in a terrifying game of hide-and-seek.</p>
<p>The impact of military drone activity spreads far beyond the frontlines. From Ukraine’s repeated long-range drone strikes on <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/live/cn9454xy0l7t">Russian oil refineries</a> and logistics centres to <a href="https://www.chathamhouse.org/2025/06/ukraines-operation-spiders-web-game-changer-modern-drone-warfare-nato-should-pay-attention">Operation Spiderweb</a> – where 117 explosive-laden drones <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/cq69qnvj6nlo">concealed in lorries</a> were smuggled into Russia and remotely released into airbases causing <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/jun/02/operation-spiderweb-visual-guide-ukraine-drone-attack-russian-aircraft">damage to 41 warplanes</a> – news reports continue to chart the creative deployment and devastation of weaponised drones. </p>
<p>Recent cases include the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/aug/06/leipzig-drone-bomb-found-near-ukrainian-plane-carrying-ammunition">discovery of a drone</a> carrying explosives next to a Ukrainian aircraft loaded with military ammunition at Leipzig airport in Germany. The drone was thwarted only by its <a href="https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2026/08/11/explosive-drone-at-leipzig-airport-whose-dna-trail-is-it">failure to explode</a> on impact and was discovered four hours later by an <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/aug/10/us-intelligence-russia-leipzig-airport-drone-bomb">airport bus driver</a>. </p>
<p>The incident underscored the broader underlying threat of weaponised drones, prompting German interior minister Alexander Dobrindt to declare they represent a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/aug/10/us-intelligence-russia-leipzig-airport-drone-bomb">“new level of danger”</a>.</p>
<p>As the possibility of <a href="https://cdn.cloud.prio.org/files/4901dc71-7424-415c-99cd-8f6e6545e64c/Martins%20et%20al%20-%20Countering%20the%20Drone%20Threat%20-%20PRIO%20Paper%202020.pdf?inline=true">drone-related incidents</a> grows, the development of wide-ranging <a href="https://cdn.cloud.prio.org/files/4901dc71-7424-415c-99cd-8f6e6545e64c/Martins%20et%20al%20-%20Countering%20the%20Drone%20Threat%20-%20PRIO%20Paper%202020.pdf?inline=true">countermeasures</a> on and beyond the battlefield continues apace.</p>
<figure class="align-center "> <img alt="A quadcopter drone hovering near a city." src="https://images.theconversation.com/files/754411/original/file-20260817-50-2k1h9e.jpg?ixlib=rb-4.1.1&q=45&auto=format&w=754&fit=clip" srcset="https://images.theconversation.com/files/754411/original/file-20260817-50-2k1h9e.jpg?ixlib=rb-4.1.1&q=45&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=1 600w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/754411/original/file-20260817-50-2k1h9e.jpg?ixlib=rb-4.1.1&q=30&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=2 1200w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/754411/original/file-20260817-50-2k1h9e.jpg?ixlib=rb-4.1.1&q=15&auto=format&w=600&h=450&fit=crop&dpr=3 1800w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/754411/original/file-20260817-50-2k1h9e.jpg?ixlib=rb-4.1.1&q=45&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=1 754w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/754411/original/file-20260817-50-2k1h9e.jpg?ixlib=rb-4.1.1&q=30&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=2 1508w, https://images.theconversation.com/files/754411/original/file-20260817-50-2k1h9e.jpg?ixlib=rb-4.1.1&q=15&auto=format&w=754&h=566&fit=crop&dpr=3 2262w" sizes="(min-width: 1466px) 754px, (max-width: 599px) 100vw, (min-width: 600px) 600px, 237px"> <figcaption> <span class="caption">A quadcopter drone hovering near a city.</span> <span class="attribution"><a class="source" href="https://unsplash.com/photos/silhouette-of-quadcopter-drone-hovering-near-the-city-p_5BnqHfz3Y">Goh Rhy Yan / Unsplash</a></span> </figcaption> </figure>
<h2>Downing drones</h2>
<p>Drones constitute novel threats that cannot simply nor solely be addressed with <a href="https://cdn.cloud.prio.org/files/4901dc71-7424-415c-99cd-8f6e6545e64c/Martins%20et%20al%20-%20Countering%20the%20Drone%20Threat%20-%20PRIO%20Paper%202020.pdf?inline=true">traditional defence and security systems</a> designed for large, fast-moving crewed aircraft. That the US Department of Defense recently launched an online <a href="https://www.defensenews.com/news/pentagon-congress/2026/08/10/pentagon-launches-online-marketplace-for-counter-uas-technology/">counter-drone marketplace</a> to simplify acquiring vetted counter-drone technology – and that Nato <a href="https://www.nato.int/en/news-and-events/articles/news/2026/07/07/nato-allies-invest-40-billion-dollars-in-counter-drone-capabilities-and-drone-training">plans to follow suit</a> – underscores the <a href="https://dronecenter.bard.edu/files/2018/02/CSD-Counter-Drone-Systems-Report.pdf">growth of this issue</a> in recent years. </p>
<p>Counter-drone systems are typically divided into <a href="https://dronecenter.bard.edu/files/2018/02/CSD-Counter-Drone-Systems-Report.pdf">two groups</a>: detection and tracking, and interdiction. Detection and tracking systems <a href="https://dronecenter.bard.edu/files/2018/02/CSD-Counter-Drone-Systems-Report.pdf">typically include</a> radar, radio-frequency, electro-optical, infrared, acoustic and combined sensor approaches. Each of these recognises the sounds and signatures of drones differently. </p>
<p>While radar offers long-range coverage, <a href="https://ecfr.eu/publication/buzzkill-how-to-defend-europe-against-drones/">it can struggle</a> with tracking smaller drones. Birds, for example, can cause false positives. Similarly, while electro-optical sensors complement radar, they can require a <a href="https://ecfr.eu/publication/buzzkill-how-to-defend-europe-against-drones/">clear line of sight</a>, limiting deployment locations. </p>
<p>The introduction of AI-enabled systems is also notable. These systems bridge the gap between tracking and intercepting by autonomously calculating a drone’s flight path, with supporting operators confirming engagement with the <a href="https://nextgendefense.com/ukraine-ai-powered-turrets/">single press of a button</a>. Reports suggest they <a href="https://united24media.com/war-in-ukraine/ukraine-deploys-ai-powered-khyzhak-turret-to-counter-fiber-optic-drones-on-front-line-18627">have been deployed</a> in Ukraine – a development that may <a href="https://media.defense.gov/2026/Jul/08/2003958884/-1/-1/1/SMALL-DRONES-BIG-PROBLEMS-A-FIRST-PRINCIPLES-APPROACH-TO-COUNTER-UAS.PDF">come to mark</a> a significant intervention. </p>
<p><a href="https://dronecenter.bard.edu/files/2018/02/CSD-Counter-Drone-Systems-Report.pdf">Interdiction</a> refers to interacting with or destroying drones. It includes non-kinetic approaches that disrupt or disable a drone without physical contact, as well as kinetic approaches which involve the physical interaction with or destruction of a drone. </p>
<p>Non-kinetic interdiction measures such as radio frequency and global navigation satellite system jamming can disrupt communication links. This prompts drones to hover, land or <a href="https://www.dedrone.com/blog/drone-jamming-techniques">“return to home”</a>. But these measures run the risk of <a href="https://ecfr.eu/publication/buzzkill-how-to-defend-europe-against-drones/">disrupting nearby external systems</a>, limiting their application in <a href="https://ecfr.eu/publication/buzzkill-how-to-defend-europe-against-drones/">urban areas and near airports</a>.</p>
<p>The Ukraine conflict also demonstrates how such countermeasures are part of a wider game of cat-and-mouse, necessitating <a href="https://static.rusi.org/tactical-developments-third-year-russo-ukrainian-war-february-2205.pdf">continuous adaptation and counter-adaptation</a>. Following the mass deployment of jammers attacking drone radio links, both sides adapted by deploying drones <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/cy40yjz10ydo">controlled by fibre-optic cables</a>. </p>
<p>By eliminating the radio link, this rendered jammers useless. This response became so integral that trails of cables now <a href="https://www.businessinsider.com/unjammable-russian-drones-leave-wires-force-ukrainians-move-with-caution-2025-11">render the battlefield</a> a tangled web, requiring soldiers to navigate with greater caution. </p>
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