Politics · September 13, 2025 · Liam Chen · 5 min
Labour won 411 of 650 seats at the July 2024 general election on just 33.7% of the vote — the clearest recent illustration of what First Past the Post does, and why reform campaigners keep pushing back.
Electoral reform is one of those UK political arguments that never fully resolves — it flares after every election that produces a result critics call disproportionate, then fades until the next one. The July 2024 general election gave reform campaigners their strongest case in a generation: a large working majority built on the lowest vote share of any majority government in modern British history. That single result explains why "how does First Past the Post actually work" searches spike every time a new parliament sits.
The mechanics are simple. The UK is divided into 650 parliamentary constituencies. In each, voters choose one candidate, and whoever gets the most votes wins the seat — not a majority of votes, just more than any single rival. The party that wins the most seats overall, or can command a majority in coalition, forms the government.
At the general election on 4 July 2024, that system produced this result:
| Party | Vote share | Seats won | Seats as % of total |
|---|---|---|---|
| Labour | 33.7% | 411 | 63.2% |
| Conservative | 23.7% | 121 | 18.6% |
| Reform UK | ~14.3% | 5 | 0.8% |
| Liberal Democrats | ~12.2% | 72 | 11.1% |
| SNP | ~2.5% | 9 | 1.4% |
Labour converted 33.7% of the national vote into 63% of the seats — a majority government elected by roughly one in three voters. Reform UK, meanwhile, won a vote share not far behind the Conservatives' but returned only five MPs, because its support was spread relatively evenly across the country rather than concentrated enough to win individual constituencies. That combination — one party's efficiently distributed vote translating into a landslide, another's inefficiently distributed vote translating into near-invisibility in the Commons — is the textbook illustration of what critics mean when they call FPTP disproportionate.
The Electoral Reform Society, campaigning for proportional representation since 1884, and the newer cross-party coalition Make Votes Matter both cite the 2024 result as their strongest evidence yet. Their core argument: under a proportional system such as the Additional Member System already used for the Scottish Parliament and Welsh Senedd, or the Single Transferable Vote used for the Northern Ireland Assembly, seat shares would track vote shares far more closely, and no single party could win a comfortable majority on a third of the vote.
Reform has not moved at Westminster despite this. The UK has held one national referendum on changing its voting system — in May 2011, on adopting the Alternative Vote for the Commons, as a condition of the Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition agreement. Voters rejected AV by 68% to 32% on a 42% turnout, and no governing party since has campaigned on a manifesto commitment to revisit the question, in part because parties that benefit from FPTP's tendency to manufacture majorities have limited incentive to change it once in power.
"A voting system's fairness is usually judged by two different, sometimes conflicting standards: does it produce a government that can actually govern, and does it accurately reflect what the electorate voted for. First Past the Post has always optimised heavily for the first at the expense of the second, and 2024 was as clear an illustration of that trade-off as British politics has produced in decades." — a distinction the Institute for Government's own explainer material on electoral systems consistently draws when comparing FPTP with proportional alternatives.
The practical effect on voters is about tactical behaviour as much as principle. In a safe seat — one a single party has won comfortably for successive elections — a vote for any party other than the incumbent's realistically has no chance of changing the outcome, which is why turnout in safe seats tends to run lower than in marginal constituencies. Voters wanting their vote to matter tactically often end up voting for whichever non-preferred candidate is best placed to beat a party they dislike, rather than for their genuinely preferred party — a pattern electoral reform campaigners call "wasted vote" behaviour and cite as evidence FPTP distorts genuine preference expression, separate from its seat-allocation effects. If you want to understand how your own constituency's history shapes whether your vote is likely to be decisive, the Commons Library's constituency-level results data is the primary source most political journalists work from.
It is also worth being precise about what FPTP does and does not determine on its own. The system does not force a two-party outcome by law — nothing prevents a third or fourth party from winning seats — but the mathematics of single-winner constituencies structurally punishes parties whose support is spread evenly across the country rather than concentrated in specific areas, which is why smaller parties with geographically clustered support, such as the SNP in Scotland, consistently convert vote share into seats far more efficiently than parties like the Greens or Reform UK, whose support is more evenly spread nationally.
Two things will determine whether 2024's result actually shifts the reform debate rather than just reigniting it temporarily. First, whether Reform UK's vote share holds or grows at the next set of elections while its seat count stays disproportionately low — a repeat performance would sharpen the "wasted vote" argument considerably, including from a party not traditionally associated with the reform movement. Second, whether any future hung parliament forces a governing party to negotiate with smaller parties whose support depends on electoral reform as a condition of coalition — historically the only route by which FPTP reform has come close to happening in the UK, as it did (unsuccessfully) in 2010-11. Absent either of those, First Past the Post's long survival despite recurring disproportionate results looks set to continue, for the same reason it always has: the parties best placed to change it are usually the ones it just made government. For a comparative look at how a proportional alternative actually functions in practice, see our explainer on voting systems compared.