Daily Junction.mobi portalWorld · January 28, 2025 · Sarah Mitchell · 11 min
The British Army has fallen to 73,000 regular soldiers—its smallest size since the Napoleonic Wars—despite a government target of 82,000. Poor pay, outsourced recruitment failures, and competition from civilian employers have created a crisis that threatens operational capability.
The British Army has 73,000 regular soldiers as of January 2025—its smallest size since the Napoleonic Wars (around 70,000 in 1815) and 9,000 short of the government's target of 82,000. The force has shrunk by 29,000 troops since 2010, when it stood at 102,000. The decline is the result of deliberate cuts (the 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review reduced the target from 102,000 to 82,000), but also catastrophic failures in recruitment and retention. Outsourced recruitment to Capita has been a disaster, with applications taking 254 days to process compared to 100 days before privatisation. Pay has lagged behind civilian jobs and other public services. Frequent moves, long deployments, and poor accommodation drive personnel to leave. The Army now loses more soldiers than it recruits each year, and without major changes, it will continue to shrink—forcing further cuts to capability and undermining Britain's ability to defend itself and support its allies.
The British Army's regular strength has fallen steadily over the past 15 years:
The decline has been accompanied by cuts to major units and capabilities:
The Army's target of 82,000 was set by the 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review and reaffirmed in the 2015 and 2021 reviews. However, the Army has not met this target since 2015 and is moving further away from it each year.
In 2012, the Ministry of Defence outsourced Army recruitment to Capita, a private contractor, in a deal worth £1.36 billion over 10 years. The contract was meant to save money (£267 million over 10 years) and improve efficiency by modernising recruitment processes and using Capita's expertise in customer service and IT. Instead, it has been a catastrophic failure:
The average time from application to starting basic training has increased from 100 days before outsourcing to 254 days under Capita (as of 2024). This is due to:
The long wait causes many applicants to drop out. The National Audit Office found that 50% of applicants withdraw before completing the process, often because they have accepted other jobs or lost interest during the wait.
Capita has missed its recruitment targets every single year from 2012 to 2024:
Over the 12 years of the contract, Capita recruited around 120,000 soldiers against a target of 170,000—a shortfall of 50,000. This is one of the main reasons the Army has shrunk.
The contract was meant to save £267 million over 10 years. Instead, the MoD has paid Capita additional fees for failing to meet targets and has had to spend money fixing IT problems and providing extra support to applicants. The National Audit Office concluded that the contract has not delivered value for money.
Despite missing targets every year, the MoD extended Capita's contract twice:
The extensions were criticised by MPs and the National Audit Office, who argued that the MoD should have terminated the contract earlier. The MoD defended the extensions by saying that ending the contract abruptly would have caused even greater disruption.
In 2024, the MoD announced it would bring Army recruitment back in-house from 2025. The new system will:
The MoD estimates the transition will take 12-18 months and cost £50 million. It is unclear whether the new system will be more successful, but it can hardly be worse than Capita's performance.
Military pay has lagged behind civilian jobs and other public services, making it harder to recruit and retain personnel. As of January 2025:
A soldier earns 16% less than a police constable and 22% less than a train driver, despite facing greater risks (deployment to combat zones, risk of injury or death) and disruption (frequent moves, long separations from family).
Military pay rises have lagged behind inflation and other public sector workers:
Over the past decade, military pay has fallen in real terms (after inflation) by around 10%, according to the House of Commons Defence Committee. This has made the military less attractive compared to civilian jobs.
Soldiers also face hidden costs that reduce their effective pay:
These costs are not faced by most civilian workers, and they reduce the attractiveness of military service.
The Army both struggles to recruit new soldiers and to retain existing ones. The outflow rate (the percentage of personnel leaving each year) has increased from 8% in 2010 to 11% in 2024. This means the Army loses around 8,000 soldiers per year—almost as many as it recruits.
Soldiers leave for several reasons:
A 2023 National Audit Office report found that 37% of military accommodation fails to meet the MoD's own standards. Problems include:
Soldiers with families face additional problems:
Military families move every 2-3 years on average, compared to every 7-10 years for civilian families. Frequent moves disrupt:
Many soldiers leave the Army to provide stability for their families.
Soldiers can spend 6-9 months away from home on operations or training exercises. Deployments to Iraq, Afghanistan, Estonia, and other locations are physically and mentally demanding, and long separations strain relationships. The divorce rate among military personnel is 3.5%, compared to 1.9% for the general population.
Soldiers leave for better-paid, more stable jobs in the civilian sector:
The Army invests heavily in training soldiers (basic training costs around £30,000 per soldier, and specialist training can cost much more), but loses many of them to civilian employers before they have completed a full career.
![[View image]](/img/british-army-recruitment-crisis-2025.jpg){kind=link}