Daily Junction.mobi portalThe Ajax programme was meant to deliver 589 modern armoured reconnaissance vehicles to replace the ageing CVR(T) fleet. Ordered in 2014 for £3.5 billion, the programme is now costed at £5.5 billion and running seven years late. The vehicles have suffered from:
The Army has had to extend the life of the CVR(T) fleet, some of which are over 50 years old, at significant cost.
The Type 26 frigate is designed to replace the Type 23 frigates that have been in service since the 1990s. Eight ships are planned, at a cost of £8.2 billion (up from £6.2 billion in 2017). The first ship, HMS Glasgow, was due to enter service in 2023 but is now expected in 2028—a five-year delay. The remaining seven ships will follow at roughly one per year, meaning the programme will not be complete until the mid-2030s.
The delays mean the Royal Navy must keep the Type 23s in service longer than planned, at increasing maintenance cost and with reduced capability (the Type 23s lack the advanced radar and sonar of the Type 26).
The UK has ordered 48 F-35B Lightning II stealth fighters, with an option for up to 90 more. The F-35 is the most advanced fighter jet in the world, but it is also the most expensive:
The UK has committed to buying only 48 aircraft, enough to equip one carrier air group (24 jets on HMS Queen Elizabeth or HMS Prince of Wales, with 24 in reserve and training). This is far below the 138 Harriers the F-35 replaces, and means the UK can deploy only one carrier at a time.
The UK's nuclear deterrent—four Vanguard-class submarines carrying Trident II D5 missiles—costs around £6 billion per year to operate and maintain. The submarines are being replaced by four new Dreadnought-class boats at a cost of £31 billion over 30 years (around £1 billion per year during construction, rising to £1.5 billion per year once in service).
The nuclear deterrent is ring-fenced in the defence budget, meaning it cannot be cut to fund conventional forces. This has led to criticism that the deterrent is crowding out spending on the Army, Navy, and Air Force. The Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament argues that the £31 billion for Dreadnought could instead buy:
Supporters of the deterrent argue that nuclear weapons are essential to Britain's security and global status, and that the cost (around 10% of the defence budget) is justified. The debate is unlikely to be resolved, but the trade-off is real: every pound spent on the nuclear deterrent is a pound not spent on conventional forces.
The US defence budget is $877 billion in 2024-25, or 3.5% of GDP. This is more than the next 10 countries combined. The US has:
The US accounts for 68% of NATO's total defence spending and provides the bulk of the alliance's military capability, including nuclear weapons, strategic airlift, intelligence, and missile defence.
China's defence budget is $292 billion in 2024 (official figure; Western estimates suggest the true figure is closer to $400 billion). China has:
China is rapidly modernising its military and expanding its global reach, particularly in the Indo-Pacific. The UK is increasing its focus on the region (the 2021 Integrated Review identified the Indo-Pacific as a priority), but Britain's military presence is dwarfed by China's.
Russia's defence budget is $109 billion in 2024 (official figure; actual spending is likely higher due to off-budget items). Russia has:
Russia's military has been severely degraded by the war in Ukraine, with heavy losses of personnel and equipment. However, Russia retains the world's largest nuclear arsenal (5,580 warheads, compared to the UK's 225) and remains a major threat to European security.
France spends €50 billion (£43 billion) on defence, or 1.9% of GDP. France has:
France is the only other European country with nuclear weapons, aircraft carriers, and global military reach comparable to the UK. The two countries cooperate closely on defence (the Lancaster House treaties of 2010) and often deploy together.
Germany spends €66 billion (£57 billion) on defence, or 1.6% of GDP. Germany has:
Germany has the largest economy in Europe but has historically under-invested in defence. The war in Ukraine has prompted a major increase in German defence spending (the government announced a €100 billion special fund in 2022), and Germany is now NATO's second-largest spender by total budget (overtaking the UK in 2024).
The UK's defence posture is shaped by three main threats:
Russia is the most immediate military threat to the UK and NATO. Russia's invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 shattered the post-Cold War security order and demonstrated that large-scale conventional war in Europe is possible. Russia has:
The UK has responded by increasing its military presence in Eastern Europe (leading a NATO battlegroup in Estonia), providing military aid to Ukraine (£3 billion in 2024), and strengthening cyber and intelligence capabilities.
China is a long-term strategic challenge rather than an immediate military threat. China's military modernisation, territorial ambitions (particularly regarding Taiwan), and assertiveness in the South China Sea pose risks to UK interests:
The UK has increased its military presence in the Indo-Pacific (deploying the HMS Queen Elizabeth carrier strike group in 2021) and deepened defence partnerships with Japan, South Korea, and Australia (the AUKUS pact with the US and Australia).
Terrorism and instability in the Middle East, North Africa, and the Sahel pose ongoing threats to UK security. The UK maintains military deployments in:
The UK also faces domestic terrorism threats (both Islamist and far-right) that require intelligence and counter-terrorism capabilities.
The UK faces difficult choices about its defence priorities. The armed forces cannot do everything with the current budget, and the government must decide what to prioritise:
The most straightforward solution is to increase the defence budget. The government could commit to 3% of GDP (around £75 billion per year), which would close the funding gap and allow the armed forces to recruit more personnel, buy more equipment, and maintain readiness. However:
The UK could prioritise capabilities needed to fight a major war (against Russia or China) and reduce or eliminate capabilities for lower-intensity operations (counter-terrorism, peacekeeping, humanitarian intervention). This would mean: